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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
appellant submits the within Reply Brief in response to new 
matters raised by the respective appellees. The issues raised 
by the two appellees are quite different. Point I of this 
Brief replies to the arguments raised by defendant Salt Lake 
County. Point II replies to the arguments raised by defendant 
Truman G. Madsen. 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY WHICH IS FULLY RIPE FOR THE GRANTING 
OF JUST COMPENSATION 
Salt Lake County has done an excellent job of camouflaging 
the issues by submitting and arguing a host of irrelevant 
facts, sideshows and non-issues. A purpose of this Reply Brief 
will be to distinguish between these non-issues raised by Salt 
Lake County and the real issue on appeal - namely the issue of 
ripeness. 
A. What This Appeal Is Not About 
1. This is not a case that hinges upon subtle 
distinctions between "facially" or "as applied" takings. This 
involves a regulatory taking which if applied renders the 
property useless for any viable purpose. The reduction in 
value from $95,000 to zero has never even been challenged. If 
the property is useless everyone would agree that a taking has 
occurred no matter what you call it. Of course, Salt Lake 
County claims that it has never unconditionally denied 
appellant a building permit, but this goes to the issue of 
ripeness as discussed later. 
2. This appeal is not about arbitrary or capricious 
decision-making as argued by Salt Lake County at page 7 and at 
page 12 of its brief where it asserts that this is to be "the 
key issue on appeal". It is true that in plaintiff's Complaint 
he alleged, as a separate ground, that the denial of a building 
permit was arbitrary and capricious. But the appeal has not 
focused on that issue (in fact it wasn't even raised as a 
point). When private property is taken by a governmental 
entity the taker cannot be relieved of its constitutional 
obligation to pay just compensation by attempting to show that 
the taking was not arbitrary or capricious. No authority was 
offered by Salt Lake County in support of such an outlandish 
position. 
3. This case does not turn upon the sophistication level 
of Jason Arnell or the lack of diligence in discovering the 
slope ordinance or in making inquiry before purchasing the 
property. Salt lake County continues to argue such facts, and 
at page 1 depicts him as a property "developer" (not true or 
supported by the record) and as an experienced builder 
(although it is acknowledged at page 14 that his experience in 
slope construction was limited to one building in Idaho where 
he had no involvement in determining whether a slope ordinance 
existed). But all of these facts are irrelevant because the 
case of Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct. 
2448 (2001) laid to rest any question regarding the 
constitutional rights of grantees. Under Palazzolo a grantee 
stands in the shoes of his grantor. This is true regardless of 
whether the grantee knew or did not know of the slope ordinance 
when he purchased the property. Here it is undisputed that 
Arnell did not know, but again, this whole area of argument is 
a diversion having no relevance. 
4. This case is not about compliance with building codes 
or safety regulations. From day one plaintiff has always 
acknowledged that if he were to have been permitted to build on 
the sloped lot he would be required to comply with all County 
building regulations, plan reviews and approvals, inspections, 
and safety and engineering requirements. There was never any 
expectation or attempt by plaintiff to be relieved of these 
requirements and such has been made clear from the beginning. 
5. Another non-issue continuously argued by Salt Lake 
County is that the County Council is not bound to follow the 
recommendation of its Hearing Officer. Appellant does not 
dispute the County's position in this regard. Appellant merely 
argues that the County Council improperly manufactured new 
findings of fact without taking evidence and without limiting 
its findings to those facts in the Hearing Officer's record. 
That being the case, the County's attempt to justify its 
findings are rather shallow to say the least. But these 
findings are very important in understanding the County's 
position as to the real reasons for its denial of relief. 
B. What This Appeal ^s About 
1. The Issue. The appeal against Salt Lake County 
involves the issue of ripeness. It is undisputed that 
appellant has been deprived of the use of his property. Salt 
Lake County now claims that it has never unconditionally 
prohibited appellant from building on his subdivision lot, and 
has only done so because of the lack of site specific design 
detail that would enable it to determine if the building can be 
safely built. Appellant has relied upon Palazzolo vs. Rhode 
Island, supra, and other authorities cited at Point IB of his 
opening brief for the proposition that a case becomes ripe for 
the payment of compensation once the governmental agency makes 
it clear the extent of development that will be permitted; 
thereafter ripeness rules do not require the submission of 
repeated applications. It is appellant's position that the 
reasons given in Salt Lake County's formal decision for the 
denial of relief are not the same as those argued by counsel in 
this case. The failure to submit detailed site or 
architectural plans was only an incidental reason for the use 
denial. Salt Lake County purely and simply did not want to set 
a precedent for the building of structures on steep canyon 
slopes under any conditions, and this intent is clearly 
manifest by the plain language of the decision. These reasons 
are summarized at page 20 of appellant's opening brief (and the 
full County decision is attached as Addendum 5 of the opening 
brief). They include reasons that appellant could never comply 
with, because he cannot change the nature or the topography of 
his lot. That being so, the ripeness doctrine has been 
satisfied. 
2. Diamond B-Y Ranches vs. Tooele County. The case of 
Diamond B-Y Ranches vs. Tooele County, 2004 UT App. 135, 91 
P.3d 831, came to counsel's attention from the Utah Advance 
Sheets shortly after appellant's opening brief had been filed. 
This is a case squarely in point supporting appellant's 
position. Upon learning of the case, counsel immediately 
notified the other parties and put them on notice that he 
intended to rely upon Diamond B-Y Ranches in his reply brief 
(see counsel's letter of August 6, 2004, attached hereto as 
Addendum 1). Salt Lake County refers to this case beginning at 
page 21 of its brief and admits that at first blush it is 
strikingly similar to the instant case. It then attempts to 
distinguish the case, but as will be shown, the distinctions 
actually make appellant's case stronger - not weaker. 
The facts of Diamond B-Y Ranches are rather straight-
forward. In that case Tooele County denied Diamond the right 
to operate a gravel pit, thereby rendering its property 
useless. In defense of Diamond's takings claim, Tooele County 
claimed that the use permit had not been unconditionally denied 
on the merits, but on procedural grounds. Particularly it was 
claimed that Diamond never made any meaningful attempt to 
provide an environmental impact study (EIS) upon which the 
County could determine the appropriateness of approving the use 
permit. Diamond had initially sought to obtain an EIS, but, 
according to the court, understandably determined that it would 
be futile to spend over $100,000 for a report in light of the 
County's opposition. The primary objection to operating the 
gravel pit had consistently been the property's proximity to 
the town of Stockton and the resultant health, safety and 
welfare concerns, which, according to the court, was something 
that an EIS could not change. Thus, the decision of the trial 
court was reversed and the element of ripeness was determined 
to have been met. 
Diamond B-Y Ranches and the instant case are very much the 
same. There, Tooele County denied a use permit and claimed at 
trial that an EIS had not been provided; its real reason for 
the denial, as reflected in the minutes of the County 
Commission, was the proximity of the gravel pit to the town of 
Stockton and the potential health and safety concerns. Here, 
Salt Lake County denied a building permit and claimed at trial 
that detailed design data had not been provided; the real 
reasons for the denial as reflected by the decision of the 
County Council, was its reluctance to depart from the Wasatch 
Canyon Master Plan, its fear of what it perceived as a bad 
precedent, and the multiple health and safety concerns as 
outlined in the decision. The two cases are on all fours. 
Salt Lake County has attempted to distinguish the cases by 
arguing (1) that in Diamond B-Y Ranches there was a good faith 
effort to obtain the EIS, and (2) the court considered other 
evidence from minutes of the County Commission to determine the 
"actual reasons" for the denial of the permit. As to (1) the 
whole rationale of the opinion has nothing to do with good 
faith. Further, the facts showed that there was abandonment of 
follow-up efforts to obtain the EIS because of the cost. Also 
here, there is no evidence whatsoever that appellant has not 
acted in good faith.1 
1
 Arnell has always claimed that he fully cooperated with Salt 
Lake County in providing requested materials, and it is 
unfortunate that the record certified by Salt Lake County does 
not contain the materials that were provided. Shafer's 
Affidavit that materials furnished were of a general or 
conclusionary nature is itself conclusionary. But all of this 
is irrelevant in light of the County's ultimate decision and 
the reasons given therein for the denial of a building permit. 
As to (2), in the instant case there is no reason to look 
for outside intent evidence because here the decision itself 
goes into great detail describing the reasons for the denial. 
That is why the instant case is so much stronger than Diamond 
B-Y Ranches. The 6 page written decision was solemnly signed 
off by the Chairman of the Salt Lake County Council and 
concurred in by eight Councilmen. Salt Lake County has made it 
clear to Jason Arnell that it will not approve development for 
a multitude of reasons. And most of those reasons have 
absolutely nothing to do with the submission of detailed 
architectural plans or structural design proposals. Thus, 
under both federal (Palazzolo) and state (Diamond B-Y Ranches) 
law, the case is fully ripe for the payment of just 
compensation as required by both constitutions. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RESCIND HIS CONTRACT 
WITH APPELLEE MADSEN 
As noted in the prior briefs, appellant has relied upon 
three grounds in support of recision. These include (1) mutual 
mistake of fact, (2) breach of covenant under the warranty 
deed, and (3) breach of implied warranty of fitness for 
purpose. Each if these grounds would independently support the 
recision, and appellant need prevail on only one. All, 
however, are meritorious. 
A. Mistake. Madsen's one and only argument to rebut 
appellant's mistake theory is that the doctrine of mistake 
applies only to mistakes of "existing facts". This statement 
of law is not disputed by appellant, and in fact appellant 
relies upon the same authorities as Madsen with respect to the 
broad concept. But we aren't dealing here with a mistake of 
some future expectation. We are dealing with a mistake of an 
existing fact. A basic assumption of the contract was that the 
lot being purchased was a buildable lot. The trial court 
mistakenly considered the failure to obtain a building permit 
as not being an existing fact. But the failure to obtain a 
building permit was not the mistaken fact; rather, it was the 
existence of the slope ordinance which made the lot 
unbuildable, which existed at the time of the contract, and 
which neither the buyer nor the seller knew about. The failure 
to obtain a building permit was merely a later event which 
rather conclusively established the materiality of the mistake. 
It is not uncommon for courts to allow recision in cases 
where the parties have mutually mistaken beliefs about zoning 
or building restrictions. Appellant has argued some of these 
cases beginning at page 30 of his opening brief, and 
particularly has relied upon Rancourt vs. Verba, 678 A.2d, 886 
(VT 1996), Lovier vs. Meteye, 260 So.2d, 377 (LA 1972), and 
Millman vs. Swan, 127 S.E. 166 (VA 1925), all being directly in 
point. The trial court ignored these cases in its decision. 
Likewise, Madsen totally ignores and makes no reference to them 
in his brief. Nor does he offer a single contra authority. 
Appellant's mistake theory is supported by respectable legal 
authorities, which have been presented to the court completely 
unrebutted. 
B. Breach of Covenant Under Warranty Deed. Appellant's 
position with respect to this point is fully briefed under 
Point III of his opening brief. Except as may be noted under D 
herein, there is nothing new to address. Should the court see 
any need to reach this point, it simply will have to decide 
whether to strictly follow some rather narrow language from a 
couple of cases that are not factually similar, or whether to 
apply the broader and more modern definition of what 
constitutes an encumbrance. It is difficult for appellant to 
understand why a restriction that renders a property useless 
for any viable purpose is not an encumbrance. 
C. Implied Warranty of Fitness. In this case the trial 
court brushed off appellant's implied warranty of fitness 
argument in a one line comment that "Utah does not recognize a 
claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability in real 
estate sales" citing Snow Flower Homeowners Association vs. 
Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 UT App. 207, 31 p.3d 576. Appellee 
likewise cites Snow Flower as being controlling. However, Snow 
Flower is distinguishable from the instant case. Snow Flower 
involved a claim for various construction defects and building 
code violations which it claimed rendered certain condominium 
units to be uninhabitable. Although the action included a 
claim for breach of an implied warranty of fitness, the court 
carefully noted both at footnote 1 and at page 582 of the 
Opinion, that the claim for fitness, based upon the undisputed 
facts, was undistinguishable from the claims of inhabitability. 
Thus, the decision proceeded on a habitability theory, not a 
fitness theory, and the case of American Towers Owners 
Association vs. CCI Mechanical, Inc. 930 P.2d, 1182 (Utah 1996) 
was deemed to be dispositive. 
The instant case does not involve the issue of 
habitability, as no structure is involved in which to inhabit. 
This is strictly a claim involving the implied warranty of 
fitness. The property itself was not fit for the purpose in 
which it was sold - namely to construct a residence. That 
being so, the habitability cases do not apply and the issue 
before the court becomes whether Utah recognizes an implied 
warranty of fitness in connection with real estate 
transactions. The post-American Towers case of Fennell vs. 
Green, 2003 UT App. 291, 77 P.3d 339, implies that it does, as 
do the other authorities cited under Point IV of appellant's 
opening brief. 
D. Other Arguments Raised by Madsen. Madsen has made 
other arguments throughout his brief which he claims would 
preclude appellant from the remedy of recision. These include 
an argument that the obtaining of a variance is still viable; 
that appellant failed to make any diligent inquiry regarding 
building restrictions before purchasing the lot; that the 
merger doctrine would defeat appellant's claim; that the 
doctrine of caveat emptor applies; and that there was no 
contract between the parties to rescind. These arguments will 
be responded to in the following paragraphs. 
The buildability argument is basically the very same 
argument made by Salt Lake County, namely that its reason for 
denying a building permit was merely because appellant did not 
provide detailed design information and that the lot is in fact 
buildable. That argument is fully addressed under Point I 
which clearly establishes the real reasons for the denial -
reasons that are impossible to comply with. In addition, the 
authorities relied upon by appellant which support recision 
based upon a mistaken belief as to zoning and regulatory 
matters do not require a party to make heroic efforts to change 
the zoning or to escape the regulation as a condition of 
recision. Appellant has fought this battle against Salt Lake 
County for more than four years, and is not required to start 
over. 
With respect to the claim that appellant failed to make 
reasonable inquiry, appellant does not challenge the basic 
concept that further inquiry may be expected if circumstances 
exist that would put a reasonable person on notice of a 
potential problem. The weakness of Madsen's position is that 
he cannot come up with any fact that would cause a reasonable 
person to make further inquiry. Indeed, the lot was in a 
platted residential subdivision. The purchase was accomplished 
in the usual and customary manner. The closing was handled by 
a title company and a standard owner' s policy of title 
insurance was issued. Appellant observed other residences 
already in existence along the same slope in the subdivision. 
Just because appellant happens to be a builder and knows that 
one must obtain a building permit before building a home 
doesn't require him, in the absence of something to put him on 
notice, to read all of the County ordinances before buying a 
subdivision lot. Real estate lawyers don't do this and neither 
does anyone else. Nor is it common practice to apply for a 
building permit before one buys a residential subdivision lot. 
Madsen can't point to a single thing Madsen did that was 
unreasonable except for his bald assertions that because Arnell 
is a builder he somehow should have known. Madsen himself 
owned the property for twenty-one years and also owned other 
lots in the same subdivision. It just isn't very persuasive 
for a seller without knowledge of building restrictions who 
owned the lot for twenty-one years to expect that a buyer 
should know more than he does. Again, it is undisputed that 
neither party knew of the slope restrictions and both parties 
entered into the transaction under the assumption that the 
subdivision lot was a buildable lot. That being so, and the 
understanding of both parties being a basic assumption of the 
contract, appellant is entitled to rescind. 
Appellant is somewhat bewildered in attempting to 
understand how the merger doctrine applies to this case. The 
merger doctrine is simply to the effect that provisions of a 
preliminary or antecedent contract are merged into a warranty 
deed and extinguished. Spears vs. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d, 
742. But the whole concept of merger is irrelevant here. 
Appellant is making no attempt to enforce the terms of a merged 
or extinguished preliminary agreement. His action is based 
upon a mutual mistake of fact and upon the Warranty Deed 
itself. Warranty deeds are routinely rescinded for mutual 
mistake. Madsen hasn't cited a single authority to the 
contrary and in the absence of such authority his merger 
argument should not be given any further credibility. 
Nor does the doctrine of caveat emptor apply. Madsen 
relies solely upon the case of Loveland vs. Orem City Corp., 
746 P.2d, 763 (Utah 1987). Loveland involves the wrongful 
death of a child who drowned in an open canal that bordered on 
the property. The court merely held under a caveat emptor 
reasoning that in the absence of express agreements a purchaser 
of land is expected to make his own examination of the 
condition of the land and generally is not liable for harm 
resulting to the purchaser or others from defective conditions 
that exist at the time of the transfer. Loveland deals only 
with concepts of tort liability. It has absolutely nothing to 
do with rescissions of contracts, and under no stretch of the 
imagination could ever be interpreted to change traditional 
contract principles of mistake or warranty. Further, Madsenfs 
caveat emptor argument was not raised in the trial court and is 
inappropriate to raise on appeal. 
And finally, Madsen's no contract theory is baffling to 
say the least. Madsen seems to be saying that because there 
was no preliminary contract that preceded the cash/deed 
transaction there was no contract to rescind. In other words, 
his argument is that an executed contract, as opposed to an 
executory contract, can no longer be rescinded. If any such 
principle exists, appellant has never heard of it, and 
certainly Madsen has offered not authority for such an 
unorthodox position. 
CONCLUSION 
As shown under Point I herein there has been an 
unconstitutional taking of the subject property and the case is 
ripe for the payment of just compensation. In addition, 
appellant is entitled to rescind his contract with appellee 
Madsen on any one of the three grounds shown in this brief. 
Based thereon, the summary judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed. In doing so, appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted and appellee's respective Motions 
for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
DATED THIS ;g day of October, 2004. 
David E. West 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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